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1. Introduction
By reforming the present merger control system as radically as needed, therefore,
I am determined to ensure that it remains a key instrument to foster Europe’s
economic success in the years ahead.
Mario Monti, EU Commissioner for Competition, 7 November 2002
The modernization package of European merger control, initiated in 1999, led to the
adoption of Council Regulation 139/2004 in May 2004 (ECMR 04). Several observers
interpreted this major institutional change as a shock reaction to events that had hap-
pened in the early 2000s, when three prohibition decisions of the Directorate General for
Competition (DG Comp) were overruled by the Court of First Instance (CFI).1 In all
three successful appeals, the CFI identified the main problems as being related to the
rigor of economic analysis conducted by DG Comp and the standard of proof the decision
was based upon. While these reverses certainly were an indicator of the need for reform,
they were not the cause: A Green Paper calling for a revision of European merger law
had been published as early as December 2001.
One of the major goals of the merger policy reform was to achieve what became
known as a ’more economic approach’ in merger control, i.e. an approach closer to
economic principles. Numerous important changes were made along these lines: an
efficiency defense clause was introduced, the office of the chief economist and his team
were created, the timetable for remedies was improved, guidelines for horizontal mergers
were issued, and the old ’dominance test’ (DT) was abandoned in favor of the ’significant
impediment of effective competition test’ (SIEC).2 This last point is probably the most
substantive change introduced by the reform. The main problem with the old DT was
that it worked as a cumulative two-part test. A merger was to be declared incompatible
with the common market if it ’creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of
which effective competition would be significantly impeded’. This implies that – as was
later confirmed by the CFI – the second part of the test, the impediment of effective
competition, only applied if the criterion of the first part, the creation of a dominant
position, was met. Mergers reducing effective competition without the creation of a
dominant position could not be challenged under the old legislation, whereas the creation
of a dominant position is no longer a necessary condition for intervention by DG Comp
post-reform.
1The cases in question are Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel.
2Lyons (2004) discusses these reforms in greater detail. The problems with the DT and the advantages
of the SIEC are summed up in Vickers (2004), while Boege and Müller (2002) present arguments
against parting from the well-established DT test.
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The reception of the ECMR 04 was generally favorable. Commentators expected the
quality and effectiveness of the decisions to improve due to the new approach, which
enables a more flexible analysis closer to economic principles. Yet, some commentators
feared that the cost of increased flexibility stemming from the adoption of more sophis-
ticated tools in the assessment of unilateral effects and efficiency gains could be a loss in
predictability of the merger control process.
Several years have passed since the introduction of the new merger regulation, enough
time to make the first assessment of its effects. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive
approach to empirically evaluate whether the modernization of European merger control
has succeeded in attaining the goal of increasing its effectiveness. We analyze 326 mergers
covering most major cases scrutinized by DG Comp until December 2007 to empirically
assess the economic impact of the change in legislation and institutions brought about
by the new ECMR 04. We base our evaluation exercise on a number of maintained
theoretical assumptions coming from standard merger theory in an oligopolistic setting
(e.g. Farrell and Shapiro (1990)) and the use of stock-market event studies to measure
the effect of mergers and merger control decisions. From this starting point, we propose
four dimensions of effectiveness of EU merger policy: predictability, decision errors, rent-
reversion, and deterrence. For each of these, we adopt a before-and-after approach to
single out the effects of the reform.
First, we test the predictability of the European merger control procedure. We estimate
a simple probit model, where the decisions of DG Comp are a function of observable
characteristics. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007),
Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a)), we find that
several institutional and procedural variables play a significant role in explaining the
Commission’s decision-making. More importantly, we do find evidence that predictability
and, in particular, the ability to predict an outright clearance has substantially decreased
since the introduction of the reform.
Next we assess whether the introduction of the new merger regulation has influenced
the frequency and determinants of systematic mistakes made by the EU Commission
(EC).3 Following Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), we initially assess the competitive
consequences of the mergers using the abnormal stock market returns of competitors to
the merging firms. We define cases in which DG Comp remedied a merger that the stock
market regarded as pro-competitive (type I errors) as well as instances in which the EC
failed to remedy mergers that were regarded as anti-competitive (type II errors). We
3The terms DG Comp and European Commission (or EC) will be used interchangeably throughout
this paper.
3
observe that the overall frequency of errors did not significantly change after the reform.
Yet, the EC’s more pro-active attitude after the reform produced a shift toward more
type I and less type II errors. In phase 2, however, it appears that the EC has become
too lenient, since type II errors increase during this investigation phase compared to
pre-reform.
In a third step, we estimate the degree of rent-reversion induced by the different merger
control instruments used by DG Comp. Under a set of maintained assumptions, the
relation between the abnormal returns around the announcement of a merger and those
around the EC’s decision can be interpreted to indicate the success of merger policy in
eliminating anti-competitive rents created by a merger (see Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu
(2010a)). While we find statistically significant full rent-reversion for prohibitions pre-
reform, we do not find such reversion for remedies prior to ECMR 04. We cannot estimate
the effects of prohibitions after the reform since there are so few, however, we find weak
evidence that remedies have become more effective.
Finally, we look at a fourth dimension of effectiveness, which is related to the indirect or
deterrent effects of merger control.4 An effective competition policy should induce firms
to obey antitrust rules and, hence, deter firms from proposing anti-competitive mergers.
Thus, we estimate the probability of a merger to be anti-competitive as a function of
past EC decisions. This is a novel approach and adds to the (limited) existing literature
that has only looked at whether merger policy tools affect the number of notified mergers
or the proportion of horizontal to total mergers (Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros
(2009) and Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2010)). We find that, pre-reform, prohibitions
as well as phase-1 remedies have a deterrence effect on the likelihood of proposing an
anti-competitive merger. Post-reform, the deterrence properties of blockings is replaced
by the deterrent effect of withdrawn or aborted mergers. These findings might be ex-
plained by the post-reform policy shift away from prohibitions, which appear to have
been substituted by more merger withdrawals by the firms.
Combining event study methodology with econometrics – an approach pioneered by
Ellert (1976) – has proven to be a fruitful empirical methodology in the assessment of
business combinations and merger policy.5 Whereas traditional techniques rely on indi-
rect measures of market power such as concentration ratios or subjective measures of the
4As pointed out by Sørgard (2009), an optimal merger policy entails deterrence, i.e. the effect a decision
has on firms’ future merger behavior.
5The event study analysis of mergers was first extended to rivals by Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983).
Brady and Feinberg (2000), Aktas, De Bodt, and Roll (2004), Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007), Duso,
Neven, and Röller (2007), and Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a) use this methodology to evaluate
EU merger control.
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importance of entry barriers and the prospect for coordinated effects, the event study
approach allows us to directly compute an independent evaluation of the merger and
the merger control decision.6 However, the legitimacy of the event study approach in
evaluating mergers has been put into question since it itself presents several shortcom-
ings. Criticisms predominantly include the role of expectations and externalities in stock
market data (e.g. McAfee (1988) and Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010)). We recognize
the validity of these criticisms and propose several ways to deal with them. First, our
sample yields a particularly accurate assessment of the rivals’ identity, since Commission
experts have carefully identified the relevant product market for every merger. We there-
fore reduce the potential bias toward zero of the abnormal returns earned by rivals as a
group, which would be caused by including firms that are not fundamentally affected by
the merger. Second, the merger’s announcements and the Commission’s decisions might
reveal information other than the pure competitive or profitability effect of the event,
such as the effect of industry shocks triggering a merger wave, future acquisition prob-
ability, and the information about the allocation of the roles of insiders and outsiders.
We tackle these issues twofold. We carefully choose the announcement date and the ap-
propriate event window to reduce the influence of other triggering shocks and, even more
importantly, we correct for the expectations of market participants about the merger pro-
ceedings prior to events. By conditioning on all the merger-specific information available
around the merger announcement, our correction for the market expectations should help
us insulate the pure surprise element for any specific event and, hence, help to measure
the competitive effect of the merger and the merger control decision. Finally, we conduct
a comprehensive series of robustness tests to derive consistent evidence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is concerned with our basic framework, the
methodology and main assumptions. Section 3 presents the sources of the data, some
summary statistics, and the estimations of the merger and merger control decision effects
by means of stock-market event studies. Section 4 presents the results of the probability
of intervention estimation, the analysis of the frequency and determinants of type I and
type II errors, the rent-reversion regressions, and the deterrence regressions respectively.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
This section provides a unified framework for assessing merger control. This framework
is then used to discuss our four dimensions of effectiveness via empirical tests, which have
6Monti (2008) discusses how stock market reactions could be incorporated into the EC’s decisions.
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been partially developed in our previous work (e.g. Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007) and
Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a)) and are partially newly designed in this paper. The
objective of our analysis is to use this general framework to measure the impact of the
modernization package of European merger control by comparing the periods pre-reform
(January 1990 to May 2004) and post-reform (June 2004 to the end of 2007).7
The starting point of our methodology is that merger control aims at avoiding anti-
competitive (i.e. consumer welfare decreasing) mergers by either blocking or remedying
them or by deterring them. One of the main challenges in the empirical assessment of
merger control is the ability to, first, define and, second, measure the anti-competitive
nature of a merger. Next, we clearly state the assumptions needed to address these
identification and quantification issues.
2.1. Assumptions
2.1.1. Theoretical Identification
We define an anti-competitive merger as one that reduces consumer welfare.8 Our basic
setting is a standard static merger model in oligopolistic markets. The well-documented
result of this literature is that mergers exert two externalities on rivals. The market
power effect captures the impact of the reduction in competition brought about by a
combination, absent any efficiency gains (Stigler (1950)). For instance, in a Cournot
setting, when a subset of firms in the market merges and jointly maximizes profits, they
find it optimal to reduce their production. Under mild assumptions, this effect triggers
the response of the remaining market participants to increase their production but by
less than the merging firms. Hence, aggregate market output in the post-merger situa-
tion decreases, price rises, and consumer welfare is lower (Farrell and Shapiro (1990)). A
similar mechanism generates price increases of merging firms and rivals and a reduction
of consumer welfare in models where firms compete in prices and goods are differentiated
(Deneckere and Davidson (1985)). Hence, a horizontal merger creates a positive external-
ity for the competitors of the merging firms: via the "price umbrella" it increases their
profits. The second externality, called the efficiency effect (Williamson (1968)), relies
on the assumption of merger-specific synergies: Economies of scale, knowledge sharing,
7We chose the date in which the new merger regulation legally came into force to define the pre- and
post- reform periods. However in section 4.5.2, we discuss this issue and the robustness of our results
to the choice of a different date.
8In this paper we assume that the antitrust agency has a consumer-welfare standard, which is the
standard adopted by the European Commission as well as most other competition authorities. Thus,
we will not discuss the "right" welfare criterion in merger control. For such a discussion see Motta
(2004) and Neven and Röller (2005).
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patent-pooling, etc., allow the merged entity to produce more efficiently than before,
increasing the competitive pressure on its rivals and thus exerting a negative externality
on them.
In most mergers both effects co-exist and what matters for welfare is the net effect of
these antipodal forces. As Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show, there exists a critical level of
efficiency gains such that the market power effect is exactly compensated for and the new
equilibrium price and aggregate production is the same pre- and post-merger.9 Looking
at this net effect thus allows us to infer the competitive nature of a merger. When the
positive externalities exceed the negative externalities, i.e. the efficiency gains are not
enough to compensate for the market power effect, rivals’ profits increase, while consumer
surplus decreases, since prices are higher than before the merger. The first identifying
assumption of our framework is, therefore, that a post-merger increase in competitors’
profits is an indication of the merger being anti-competitive.
This identification assumption is quite general and robust and holds for a wide class
of oligopoly models. However, it could prove problematic in some circumstances such as
vertical or conglomerate mergers and endogenous mergers in a dynamic context. Vertical
mergers may cause market foreclosure, where both rivals and, potentially, consumers
lose depending on the parametrization of the demand function, thereby violating our
identification assumption concerning the nature of the merger. In a more general dynamic
model, where horizontal merger proposals are endogenous and come over time and an
antitrust authority can set its optimal policy (Nocke and Whinston (2008)), the holding
of our assumption depends on the nature of the sequence of mergers and the merger
policy. We therefore control for the merger wave and the horizontal nature of the merger
in our regressions. As a further robustness check that we discuss in section 4.5.1, we
exclude from our sample mergers that are not purely horizontal and obtain qualitatively
similar results as for the whole sample.
2.1.2. Empirical Measurement
The next step is to measure the profitability effects brought about by the merger and
merger control decision. Following an extensive literature, we do that by using stock
market reactions to the merger’s and decision’s announcements, i.e. a stock-market
event study.10 This methodology relies on the semi-strong version of the efficient capital
9Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that these efficiency gains have to be rather substantial to outweigh
the market power effect.
10As reported by Kothari and Warner (2007), by the end of 2006, there were more than 500 published
papers utilizing the event study methodology in different areas of economics.
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market hypothesis, which asserts that stock prices fully reflect the information available
to the market on the given commodity at any point in time. This implies that it is not
possible to outperform the market index using commonly available information, or, more
formally, that the daily return of a commodity i (Ri,t) is proportional to the market
index (Rmarket,t) at any given point in time t:
Ri,t = α+ βRmarket,t + εi,t (1)
where εi,t is an i.i.d. error term. The idea that markets are informationally efficient
is central to the entire event-study literature starting from Fama (1970) and constitutes
our second crucial assumption.
Under this assumption, model (1) can be used to estimate the ’normal’ return of a
firm at any given point in time as R̂i,t = α̂+ β̂Rmarket,t. When observing a stock market
reaction to the announcement of a particular event (e.g. a merger or a merger control
decision), the change in the equity value (with respect to the ’normal’ value) of firms
affected by this event can then be taken as a measure of the (discounted) additional
profits that are expected to accrue as a consequence of the event. This stock reaction,
also called abnormal return, can be seen as a measure of the profitability of such an event
and can be measured as ARi,t = Ri,t − R̂i,t. Since there might be information leakages,
which influence firm i’s return before (or after) the merger announcement, the total
valuation effect of the event is defined as the sum of the daily abnormal returns within
a window of several days around the event: the cumulative abnormal return (CAR).
Finally, we aggregate these measures to obtain a profitability measure for the merging
firms and the competitors by taking a weighted sum of the individual CARs, where the
weights are represented by the relative market value of each firm. We call these measures
"cumulative aggregate abnormal returns" (CAARs).11
The measured CAARs around a merger’s announcement (or the EC’s decision) also
might entail effects other than the pure competitive effects and, in particular, the effects
of specific forces triggering the merger (e.g. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002)), information
about the roles of merging firms and rivals (e.g. Fridolfsson and Stennek (2010)), and the
market expectations about the outcome of the merger control decision (Eckbo (1992)).
Hence, the third important assumption of our methodology is that we can effectively
control for the merger’s triggering events and the allocation of roles, by choosing the
right announcement dates and event windows. We use the date of the first merger-
specific rumors in the business press as the merger announcement (e.g. Banerjee and
Eckard (1998). The surprise element to the stock market is likely to be largest around
11In the appendix, we provide a formal derivation and a discussion of the CAARs.
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this date, since the likelihood that the merger is already anticipated is still low. Moreover,
using the merger-specific rumors coupled with a large event window should help us to
control for the uncertainty in the allocation of the roles (acquirer, target, rival). In
particular, we consider different event windows for the various events to account for
different information leakages. For the merger announcement, we use a long window of
50 trading days before the event’s date and 5 days after.12 For the phase 1 decision, we
use a short window of 11 days (-5, +5), since information leakages are likely to be modest
before the phase 1 decision given the strict timing procedure of the EU merger control.
For a phase 2 decision, however, we again use the long window of 56 days (-50, +5) to
account for information leakages due to the investigation and negotiation process during
that phase (see also Appendix A.2).
Finally, to tackle the issue of market expectations about the merger proceedings, we
estimate the probability of intervention and use it to correct our CAAR measures. The
logic of this correction is as follows: The stock market builds expectations on the likely
outcome of the antitrust procedure, which should already be priced in the stocks of
merging firms and rivals at the announcement of a merger. Thus, neither at the an-
nouncement nor at the decision we do measure the whole extent of the rents generated
by the merger or the whole effect of the EC’s decision, but only an update of the market’s
beliefs. We thus have to adjust the measured abnormal returns for the expectations of
the stock market. An (extreme) example of a prohibition might clarify the intuition. If
we measure a rent of 100 million US dollars around the merger announcement, but the
ex ante expectation of the market is that the EC will block this merger with a proba-
bility of 20%, the full extent of rents is actually (100/(1 − 0.2)) = US$125 million. See
Appendix A.4 for a detailed formal derivation. Given our setup, we are then confident
that the corrected CAARs around merger j’s announcement A (ΠA∗fj ) can be seen as a
meaningful measure of the competitive effects of the merger on merging firms (f = M)
or competitors (f = C), while the corrected CAARs around the EC’s decision (D) on
merger j (ΠD∗fj ) can be seen as a meaningful measure of the effect of the decision on the
group f ’s profitability.
A final assumption, which is however only needed in the rent-reversion test, is that
the market power and efficiency effects of a merger can, at least partially, be separated
by an effective antitrust action: Well-implemented remedies imposed by the EC should
eliminate the market power effect while preserving the efficiency gains generated by the
12Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010b), with a sub-sample of our data, show that the cumulative abnormal
returns calculated using this large window correlate positively and significantly with an alternative
ex-post measure of profitability based on accounting data. The correlation is, instead, much lower
and, in the case of rivals, even negative when using shorter event windows.
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merger. All of these assumptions as well as the consequences of their failure are discussed
in length and justified in greater detail in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a).
2.2. Assessing Policy Effectiveness
The innovation and main contribution of this paper is to assess the economic impact of
the introduction of ECMR 04. To achieve this goal, we look at four different dimensions
of effectiveness and explicitly analyze the differences in the performance of the EC before
and after the 2004 reform. These dimensions of policy effectiveness can be seen in a
natural chronological order. First, before the announcement of a merger, legal certainty
and predictability of the merger control procedure are important determinants of firms’
choices on the kind of merger they propose and, hence, total welfare. Therefore, our first
test analyzes the determinants of interventions by DG Comp to infer its predictability.
The second event we look at is the EC decision. An effective policy should reduce
mistakes; thus, we analyze the frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors
committed by the EC. Third, it is not only important whether the EC intervenes in the
’right’ mergers, but also whether its intervention achieves the desired results. Thus, we
look at effectiveness as measured by the degree of rent-reversion achieved by the different
merger policy instruments. Finally, a particular decision might have consequences on the
future merger behavior of other firms. We therefore analyze the deterrence effects of
the EC’s decisions by estimating how past interventions affect the competitive nature of
currently proposed mergers.
If the reform was successful in making merger policy more effective, we would expect
(1) an increase in the predictability of the merger control outcome (legal certainty),
(2) a reduction in the frequency of mistakes (decision errors), (3) a larger degree of
rent-reversion achieved by remedies, and finally, (4) a higher degree of deterrence of
anti-competitive mergers.
2.2.1. Legal Certainty, Transparency, and Predictability
The predictability of the merger control procedures is a key issue for judges, competition
lawyers, authorities and, of course, the firms. Since legal certainty and transparency of
the proceedings reduce the welfare-detrimental risk of political influence and decrease
uncertainty for the firms, the desirability of a merger control system comprised of clear-
cut, transparent and traceable rules and proceedings has long been stressed by scholars
and practitioners (e.g. Smith (1957) and Elman (1965)). The benefits of legal certainty
known to the literature are numerous: it increases the credibility of the authorities by
encouraging them to base their decisions on accurate facts and sound economic reason-
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ing, making their rulings more consistent and fair. It fosters accountability and reduces
personal biases in the decision process. It allows the concerned firms to better understand
the merger review process and predict its outcome with a certain reliability, thereby dis-
couraging them from proposing clearly welfare-reducing mergers.13 Thus, a predictable
merger control process reduces the high costs and reputation losses entailed by a lengthy
antitrust procedure (Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993)). Moreover, the transparency
of legal procedures increases the potential for harmonization among multiple regulatory
authorities. Transparency can, however, also entail costs (McAfee (2010)). By encour-
aging simple rules it might lead to repeated consistent errors, which could be avoided by
using more flexible, case-by-case criteria allowed by a rule-of-reason approach. It increases
the costs borne by antitrust authorities by imposing them to disclose the outcomes and
the economic and legal reasoning motivating their decisions. Finally, it might also delay
innovations in the adoption of more sophisticated and precise assessment techniques by
creating path dependency with respect to past decisions.
Yet, a balance of these costs and benefits reveals undoubtedly that transparency, es-
pecially with concern to the process underlying antitrust evaluation, is desirable.14 The
transparency of the proceedings of a competition authority can be classified on the basis
of the comprehensiveness and public availability of documents containing the economic
reasoning in merger cases, guidelines for their handling, and detailed statistics. In gen-
eral, the level of transparency of European merger control has been found to be laud-
able in comparison with that of other competition authorities (e.g. Gelfand and Calsyn
(2005)).15
The impact of ECMR 04 on the predictability of merger decisions, however, is am-
13In a slightly different setting, Barros (2003) theoretically proves that an increase in the uncertainty of
the antitrust policy’s implementation leads to more anti-competitive agreements to be proposed by
firms.
14Shapiro (2010), for instance, reports that the US Assistant Attorney General "explained [...] that a
major goal of revising the [US merger] Guidelines [in 2010] was to provide greater transparency [...]
and reduce the gaps between the Guidelines and actual agency practice–gaps in the sense of both
omissions of important factors that help predict the competitive effects of mergers and statements
that are either misleading or inaccurate."
15DG Competition itself is concerned with the transparency and predictability of its proceedings. For in-
stance, a press release on January, 6, 2010 reports: "Detailed explanations concerning how European
Commission antitrust procedures work in practice have just been published by the Commission’s
Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) and the Hearing Officers on the Europa
website in order to further enhance the transparency and the predictability of Commission antitrust
proceedings. The explanations are outlined in three documents, namely Best Practices for antitrust
proceedings, Best Practices for the submission of economic evidence (both in antitrust and merger
proceedings) and Guidance on the role of the Hearing Officers in the context of antitrust proceed-
ings. The documents will make it easier for companies under investigation to understand how the
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biguous. On the one hand, the publication of merger guidelines and several institutional
changes were clearly aimed at augmenting legal certainty. On the other hand, the more
intensive use of specific theoretical and econometric tools, aimed at accurately pinning
down the specificities of each single case, makes singular decisions more difficult to be
anticipated, since the decision process is less anchored on simple, general rules (e.g.
Kobayashi (1997)).16
As discussed by Voigt and Schmidt (2005), predictability can be defined as the "ca-
pacity to make predictions concerning the actions of others that have a high chance of
turning out to be correct." Before proposing a concentration, the involved firms should
be able to predict to a large extent the reaction of the competition authority on the basis
of observable characteristics related to the merger. Therefore, one testable implication
of legal certainty in merger control is the predictability of the EC’s decisions.17
Thus let Pj be the actual decision taken by the agency on merger j, which is equal to
1 when the merger is remedied or blocked, which we will call action, and zero otherwise
(clear). Let Xj be a set of observable characteristics related to the specific merger. These
might be characteristics of the merging firms, the product and geographical markets
where they operate, the nature of the merger they propose, as well as the merger policy
history up to the point in time when merger j is proposed. We measure the predictability
of the decision on the basis of goodness of fit measures of the following regression:18
Pj = α0 + α1Xj + εj (2)
We would expect changes in legal certainty to be accompanied by changes in the
predictive power of model (2), measured by standard statistics such as the pseudo −
R2, the percentage of correct predictions, the sensitivity (i.e. the proportion of actual
investigation will proceed, what they can expect from the Commission and what the Commission
will expect from them." (see: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/2)
16As noted by Christiansen (forthcoming): "[...] with the simultaneous introduction of unilateral effects
analysis and the ’efficiency defense’, it is possible not only for mergers ’below’ the previously relevant
market dominance threshold to be prohibited but also for mergers ’above’ it to be approved. This boils
down to a wider margin of discretion in decision-making, thus making the Commission’s decisions
permanently more difficult to predict."
17Similar analyses have been performed by Bergman, Jakobsson, and Razo (2005), and Bougette and
Turolla (2006). Yet, the logic of their work is not motivated by the concept of predictability but
rather by the aim of providing a test of whether the antitrust authorities give appropriate weights to
the factors that they regard as important ex ante, such as market shares, concentration, and barriers
to entry.
18We assume that the error terms εj are correlated over time, so we cluster them at the year level.
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positives which are correctly identified), and the specificity (i.e. the proportion of actual
negatives which are correctly identified).
2.2.2. Type I and Type II Errors
The first assessment of a particular decision is whether it conforms to the objectives of
merger control and, hence, whether the Commission committed mistakes. According to
our discussion in section 2.1, a benevolent agency intervenes in a merger if and only if
consumer surplus would be reduced, hence the optimal decision rule for merger j is:
Dj =


0 (clear) iff CSj ≥ 0
1 (intervention) iff CSj < 0
Let Pj again be the actual decision taken by the agency on merger j, which is equal to
1 if the merger is remedied or blocked, and zero otherwise. We say a type I error occurs if
the agency intervenes in a merger that should have been cleared without commitments,
i.e. E1j = 1 if Pj = 1 and Dj = 0, else 0, and a type II error when the agency clears a
merger that should have been blocked or remedied, i.e. E2j = 1 if Pj = 0 and Dj = 1,
else 0.19 In order to measure E1j and E2j , we need to measure Dj , which requires
an estimate of the impact of the merger on consumer surplus. Under our maintained
assumptions, consumer surplus decreases after the merger if the profits of the rivals to
the merging firms increase. Hence, the consumer welfare-maximizing merger control
decision is:
Dj = 1 if Π
A∗
Cj > 0
where ΠA∗Cj represents the corrected merger announcement CAARs of the competitors
(C) for merger j.20 Once we have defined type I and type II errors, we analyze their
determinants by running the following probit regressions:
19We assume that taking action is not strictly necessary in cases the market evaluates as pro-competitive.
The notion of type I errors we use here corresponds therefore to the weak type I errors in Duso, Neven,
and Röller (2007). Given that prohibitions were a very rare event in the entire sample and, especially,
in the post-reform period, it would be impossible to perform any econometric analysis on the strong
type I errors, i.e. pro-competitive mergers which were blocked. We will come back to this important
point in section 4.2.
20 Notice that, in order to identify whether deals are perceived as anti-competitive, we only use the
sign of the expected change in the stock price. Hence, the fact that the market may anticipate the
outcome of the antitrust procedure or any other bias in the size of the CAARs due to other market
expectations, do not introduce a bias in our identification.
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E1j = α0 + α1Xj + εj if Dj = 1 (3)
E2j = β0 + β1Xj + εj if Dj = 0 (4)
Clearly, if the agency is benevolent, then both errors should be completely random and,
hence, neither the determinants Xj not the constants α0 and β0 should have significant
explanatory power to predict them. However, in a political economy model of merger
control (e.g. Neven and Röller (2005)), the antitrust agency maximizes an objective
function containing not only the welfare of the economy but also the additional utility
that it can obtain from third parties. These include the involved firms and other agents
such as member states’ governments, which provide contingent perks or, more generally,
other kinds of private benefits. The determinants of errors Xj are thus merger-specific
characteristics and institutional and political economy variables that may influence the
decision of an antitrust agency (see Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007)).
In this political economy context, the gains generated by the merger for the merging
firms and their rivals can be seen as the amount of resources that these firms are willing
to pay to obtain their preferred outcome.21 One would expect type I errors to decrease
with the gains of the merging firms, as they are interested in obtaining a clearance for a
pro-competitive merger, and to increase with the gains of the rivals, as they would like to
block such mergers. The interests of both kinds of firms are, instead, aligned in the case
of anti-competitive mergers. Hence, the probability of a type II error should increase
with the gains of the merging firms as well as with those of the rivals, if they manage to
lobby for their favorable decision.
Second, the size of the country from which the merging firms originate could also
play a role in the outcome of a merger investigation, presumably because of the political
pressure that can be exerted by large countries (e.g. Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993)
and Horn and Levinsohn (2001)). Third, as shown by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007),
the European Commission might be protectionist and favor European versus US firms,
hence the country of origin of the merging parties might be a determinant of the EC’s
mistakes. Fourth, the EC was often alleged to define relevant markets too narrowly,
which might imply a higher frequency of errors (Neven, Nuttall, and Seabright (1993)).
Fifth, procedural issues, such as the time available to undertake the merger analysis,
may be important. In particular whether the case has been decided in phase 1 instead of
being subject to a more substantial investigation (phase 2) might increase the likelihood
21We define the gains for the merging firms and rivals as the CAARs multiplied by their market value,
i.e. the firms’ cumulative aggregate absolute value change due to the merger.
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of errors. Sixth, a full merger as compared to a partial merger or a joint venture might
be seen as more problematic since the anti-competitive effects that it generates might be
expected to be larger (e.g. Bresnahan and Salop (1986) and Gugler and Siebert (2007)),
whereas a cross-border merger might be treated more leniently since the market power
aspects might be less problematic (e.g. Neary (2007)). Seventh, the pattern of errors
may vary across the sectors in which the mergers are taking place, as some industrial
sectors are more concentrated and/or have more political influence than others. Finally,
the EC may learn over time how to implement more precise and effective remedial actions
(Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a)) and, therefore, the proclivity of errors might be a
function of the history of merger control decisions and of time.
To assess how the institutional changes introduced together with the new merger reg-
ulation affected the likelihood and determinants of the EC’s mistakes, we run the basic
regressions 3 and 4 separately on the pre- and post-reform sub-samples.
2.2.3. Rent-Reversion
The next step is to assess the ability of different policy tools to effectively reduce the
market power effects of a merger and, at the same time, to maintain the benefits to
consumers generated by increased efficiency. The logic behind the approach developed
by Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a) is that there should be a reversion of the (anti-
competitive) rents measured around the merger announcement due to the decision, if the
antitrust action is effective. This implies that decision CAARs should be systematically
negatively related to announcement CAARs when a decision is effective. We therefore as-
sess the effectiveness of an antitrust action by running the following regression separately
for merging firms and rivals:
ΠD∗fj =
∑
d
αfd +
∑
d
βfdΠ
A∗
fj + γfXj + ǫfj (5)
where ΠD∗fj is the probability-corrected decision CAAR of merging firms (f = M) and
competitors (f = C), respectively, for merger j, while ΠA∗fj is the probability-corrected an-
nouncement CAAR. We estimate different intercepts (αs) and slopes (βs) for the different
decisions (d=clearance, behavioral remedies, structural remedies, or prohibition).22
22We distinguish remedies in two broad categories: behavioral and structural. Behavioral remedies
contain all obligations concerning the conduct of the merged entity vis-à-vis its competitors. These
include access to key facilities, supply guarantees and the disentanglement of intertwined directorates.
Structural remedies mostly concern the divestiture of a business branch or a production site. Past
empirical research suggests the superiority of structural remedies over behavioral ones - e.g. the
in-house studies of the EU Commission (European Commission (2005)) and the FTC (Baer (1999)).
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In all specifications we control for time and industry effects (manufacturing and communi-
cations), as well as some merger-specific characteristics (full and conglomerate mergers).
Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a) explain in depth the sizes and signs of the inter-
cepts and slopes, which are expected if merger control is perfectly effective and under
our maintained assumptions. The key points are, however, summarized below.
Prohibitions. The most extreme action taken by the EC, i.e. to block the merger,
dissipates all rents, i.e. both the market power and the efficiency rents. Therefore, the
slope coefficient should be βprohib = −1 for merging firms and rivals. Moreover, the
regression line should pass through the origin: if the merger does not generate any rents,
no rents can be reverted by the decision, thus αprohib = 0.
Clearances. If the merger is cleared without commitments, we do not expect decision
effects that are systematically related to announcement returns, thus αclear = 0 and
βclear = 0 for merging firms and rivals. This does not need to be the case if the reaction
around the decision date conveys good news to the market about the feasibility of future
mergers. In this case, we expect positive constants and/or slopes for the rivals if the
clearing of the merger signals a green light from the EC to mergers in that particular
industry. This is even more likely if the EC makes type II errors and unconditionally
clears anti-competitive mergers.
Remedies. The situation is more complex in the case of remedies. Only market power
rents should be dissipated by the antitrust decision if it is effective. Hence, each remedial
action should entail a negative decision effect for merging firms and rivals. Hence, for
rivals, we expect a negative intercept as well as a negative slope. The former captures
the shift due to the elimination of the market power rents, while the latter indicates that
rent-reversion should be larger, the larger the size of the market power rents generated
by the merger. For the merging firms, instead, since both market power and efficiency
effects are positive, we only expect a negative slope, while we expect a zero intercept.
We run separate regressions for the pre- and post-reform periods to assess the impact
of the new merger regulation.23 The variables contained in the vector Xj are again
exogenous controls, such as year and industry dummies, and other merger-specific char-
acteristics.
2.2.4. Deterrence
Up to this point we have focused on the ex ante (predictability) and in-fieri effects
(decision errors and rent-reversion) of merger policy. However, as pointed out by Sørgard
23Only two cases were blocked post-ECMR 04, so we had to drop prohibitions from the effectiveness
regressions.
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(2009) an optimal merger policy also entails ex-post effects since it involves deterrence.
In particular, he shows that there is an optimal level of enforcement where some actions,
which in isolation would be welfare detrimental, might be optimally taken to achieve
deterrence and thus increase overall welfare. Hence, the role of deterrence is especially
important if competition authorities commit errors and if their remedies are not always
and completely effective. If this was not the case and merger policy was perfectly effective,
then firms would know ex ante that every anti-competitive merger would be blocked
or effectively remedied by the antitrust authority and, therefore, they would not even
attempt to propose such combinations. Moreover, in the absence of type I errors, firms
would always propose a pro-competitive merger knowing that it would always be cleared
and that over-deterrence would not be an issue. Hence, the existence of decision mistakes
is a key ingredient in a deterrence model.
Very few studies have empirically analyzed deterrence in merger policy. Seldeslachts,
Clougherty, and Barros (2009), by using a panel of antitrust jurisdictions over the period
1992-2003, find that prohibitions deter future merger activity, as measured by the num-
ber of merger notifications, while remedies do not. Hence, they exclusively focus on the
frequency aspect but cannot say whether merger policy over-deterred pro-competitive
mergers. The question of the composition of mergers which are deterred by the pol-
icy is analyzed in a sequent paper (Clougherty and Seldeslachts (2010)). They analyze
the US merger policy in the period 1986-1999 and show that second-request investiga-
tions and, even more so, antitrust interventions yield significant deterrence effects for
horizontal mergers, i.e. negatively affect the ratio between horizontal to total notified
mergers. They conclude that a tougher merger policy makes firms move away from po-
tentially problematic horizontal mergers toward vertical mergers that are more likely to
be efficiency-increasing. Yet, such identification is quite simplistic since many horizontal
mergers might involve efficiency-enhancing synergies. Key to the analysis of deterrence
in merger control is that a good policy should deter firms from proposing socially detri-
mental mergers but it should not over-deter and hence discourage firms from proposing
efficiency-increasing combinations.
Our analysis takes an important step in the direction of analyzing this issue and focuses
on measuring ’good’ deterrence. This is enabled by the unique information contained in
our dataset that allows a much cleaner definition of the competitive nature of each merger
and a finer prediction on the quality of deterrence achieved by the policy. For each merger
we use the indicator of its anti-competitive nature (Dj = 1 if Π
A∗
Cj ≥ 0) and test for the
deterrence effects of merger policy by looking at how past decisions affects the probability
of a particular merger to be anti-competitive. In particular, we look at how the complete
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merger policy history of the European Commission affected the anti-competitiveness of
the mergers in our sample. We thus combine measures of DG Comp’s merger policy from
the population of over 3,800 mergers scrutinized in the sample period with our dataset
to estimate a probit equation of the following type:
Djt = α0 + α1njt−2 +
∑
d
α2d
djt−2
njt−2
+ α3Xj + ǫj (6)
where Djt is equal to 1 if merger j proposed in quarter t was anti-competitive. The
variable njt−2 is equal to the total number of notifications to the EC two-quarters before
merger j was notified, and
djt−2
njt−2
represents the ratio of the total number of mergers with
outcome d (where d = remedies, blockings, or withdrawals) over the total number of
notified mergers lagged by two-quarters. Again, we control for other merger specific
determinants Xj as we do in the other regressions.
The lagged number of notifications controls for merger wave effects. While several
studies show that merger waves can be driven by periods of over- and undervaluation of
the stock market (e.g. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Harford (2005)), very
few studies have looked at how merger waves might impact the competitive effects of a
merger (e.g. Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2005) and Clougherty and Duso (2009)).
One might argue that on the wave-crest the quality of the targets and the fit of the match
between acquirer and target is worse. Hence, less efficiency-enhancing and potentially
more anti-competitive mergers will be proposed.
More importantly, the kind of merger policy decisions and their effectiveness send
signals to firms about the toughness of the authority. If merger policy deters anti-
competitive mergers, one should expect negative coefficients for all kinds of actions. Yet,
as shown by Seldeslachts, Clougherty, and Barros (2009), the kind of signal a particular
decision sends to the firms and, hence, the kind of merger the firms propose, crucially
depends on the expectations the firms have about the merger policy. It is quite clear that
prohibitions have a deterrence effect, as they represent the toughest action an antitrust
authority can take. Similarly, one could argue that when the merger parties withdraw or
abort a notified merger, this might be interpreted as an ’almost-prohibition’ (Bergman,
Jakobsson, and Razo (2005)) and, therefore, this can be expected to have similar de-
terrence effects. The deterrence effects of remedies are not so clear cut and depend on
whether they are effective and whether they come at the expense of clearances or prohi-
bitions. First, ineffective remedies cannot strongly deter as they do not constitute a real
threat for firms which want to propose anti-competitive combinations. Second, if the an-
titrust authority becomes tougher and imposes remedies on mergers which were expected
to be outrightly cleared, then the firms will see this as a negative signal and, potentially,
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some anti-competitive mergers will not be proposed. If, instead, the authority applies
remedies on mergers which were expected to be blocked, the firms may update their
beliefs, deducing that merger control has become more lenient and, therefore, propose
more anti-competitive mergers. We will use the difference between phase 1 and phase 2
remedies to shed some light on these issues.
We estimate regression (6) separately for the pre- and post-reform periods to identify
the potential effect of the reform. Notice that, similarly to the rent-reversion regressions,
we are not able to identify the effect of prohibitions post-reform, since only two mergers
were blocked after 2004.
3. Data
3.1. Data Sources
Our sample includes 326 merger cases scrutinized by the EC from the beginning of 1990
to the end of 2007. We collected information on all phase 2 mergers during the sample
period, together with a randomly matched sample of phase 1 merger cases. The first
half of the sample (157 mergers from 1990 to the end of 2002) was first developed by
Duso, Neven, and Röller (2007), whereas the 169 cases for the 2003-2007 period were
newly collected and evaluated for this paper.24 By carefully reading the text of publicly
available merger cases handled by DG Comp, we identified the merging parties, their
rivals, relevant markets, decision types, the dates of the notification, phase 1 and possibly
phase 2 decision, and some other merger-specific characteristics.25 From these decisions,
we identified a total of 3,026 involved parties, 735 of them are merging parties and 2,291
are competitors. Due to data limitations and the requirement that firms have to be listed,
the final sample contains 1,771 of these firms (522 merging parties and 1,249 competitors).
Since there are overlaps in the firms’ roles as merging parties and competitors, i.e. the
same firm appearing as a merging party and/or competitor in multiple cases, our sample
includes 1,104 unique firms.
Using the EC’s merger assessment to identify the rivals represents a particular strength
of this sample. It has the big advantage of being a much more realistic description of the
relevant markets than, say, using SIC codes, which would yield a sample of firms active
in the same branch, but possibly not competing in the specific product market concerned
24While, for the first part of the sample, phase 1 cases were taken completely randomly, we over-
sampled the phase 1 cases cleared with remedies in the 2003-2007 period. We did this because we
were particularly interested in analyzing the effects of actions in phase 1.
25All documents are publicly available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/.
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in a merger. This is particularly true for large, integrated corporations, which are active
in numerous sectors (e.g. Eckbo and Wier (1985)).
Following Banerjee and Eckard (1998), the announcement date of a merger is defined
as the date on which first rumors of that particular merger leaked to the market. This is
usually before the official notification to the EC as well as the official merger announce-
ment. We used the financial press and the Dow Jones Interactive database to identify
the dates at which the first definitive indications of the combination between the merging
parties became known.26 The total return index, market value and branch index time
series for the identified parties were downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Datastream
database, providing daily data for the variables in question.
3.2. Summary Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the dummy variables partitioning our dataset for the periods before
and after the merger policy reform in our sample and in the population.
[insert Table 1 here]
In our sample, the percentage of cases that were cleared with remedies increases from
42% in the pre-reform period to 60% post-reform. If compared to the population data
(7% pre-reform to 6% post-reform), remedied cases are clearly over-sampled. This is due
to two facts. First, we over-sampled phase 2 cases. Second, for the period 2002-2007,
we also over-sampled remedied cases in phase 1, which explains their increase from 14%
to 40%, while in the population data they are constant at a rate of 4%. Our sample,
however, mimics the population data for what concerns the use of remedies in phase 2.
They decrease from 28% to 14% from the pre- to the post-reform period in our sample
and from 3% to 1% in the population. Prohibitions represent 6% and 2% of the cases
pre- and post-reform in the sample, and 0.8% and 0.06% in the population. All other
cases have been cleared without conditions and obligations. For the population data, we
also have information on aborted or withdrawn cases. These represent 3% and 2% of the
notified cases pre- and post-reform, respectively.
[insert Figure 1 here]
26As a robustness check, we collected data on the merger’s official announcement date from the SDC
database (Thomson Reuters). Unfortunately, this database turned out to be incomplete and we
were able to identify only 240 of our original mergers. In this sub-sample, the correlation between
the first rumors and the official merger announcement is very high (0.9938). Most of the official
announcements are in an interval around five days before and two days after the first rumors. For
some 20% of the cases the first rumor was 15 days or earlier before the official announcement.
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[insert Figure2 here]
Figures 1 and 2 show the time evolution of notifications and actions in the sample
and in the population respectively. In both the sample and the population, we observe
an increasing trend in notifications with a single big drop around 2002. The proportion
of remedies in phase 2 oscillates before 1999 to then take a downward trend, while
the proportion of remedies in phase 1 increases substantially. The prohibitions ratio
displays a downward trend, with only 2 prohibitions after the merger reform. Abortions
or withdrawals stay at a rate of 4% to 6% until 2002, then slightly decrease to increase
again in 2005 and 2006.
Finally, for the mergers in our sample, we have more precise information about the
cases’ specificities (bottom part of table 1). From the pre- to the post-reform period, we
observe an increase in divestitures (from 29% to 45%), a small decrease in behavioral
remedies (from 26% to 25%), a tendency to use a narrower market definition (more
national and less EU markets), more conglomerate and full mergers, and less involvement
of US firms.
3.3. Structure of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns
We calculate the CAARs over the event windows according to the methods presented
in Appendix 6. We use the total return index from Datastream, which accounts for
dividends and corrects for stock splits. Table 2 reports mean values for merging firms
and rivals, in the pre- and post-reform periods respectively.
[insert Table 2 here]
On average, the mergers in the sample are profitable for merging firms pre-reform and
yield an increase in their stock value of around 1.6%, which is significant at the 5%
level. After the reform, mergers are still significantly profitable for merging firms yet
the average CAAR drops to 1.1%. The impact of DG Comp’s decisions on the valuation
of merging firms is very similar pre- and post- reform and entails a negative, but not
significant, drop in the firms’ stock value by 0.3% and 0.5% respectively.
The competitors’ merger announcement effects are positive (0.8%) but not significant
prior to the reform, and they increase to 1.1% and become significant at the 10% signif-
icance level post-reform. Similar to the merging firms, rivals suffer an average negative
reaction around the EC decision, which ranges between 0.3% pre-reform and 0.9% post-
reform. In both cases, however, the average CAARs are not statistically different from
zero.
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4. Empirical Results
4.1. Probability of Intervention
The first piece of evidence on the effects of the merger policy reform relates to the
predictability of antitrust intervention. The regression results of the probit model (2)
are displayed in table 3. We report the marginal effects of different sets of observable
factors that we expect to explain the intervention of the EC on a specific case. Before
looking at the coefficient estimates, we first focus on the predictive power of the probit
regressions pre- and post-reform. We then discuss in brief the main determinants of an
action and how they changed over time.
[insert Table 3 here]
The first observation is that the pseudo− R2 pre-reform (0.51) is more than twice as
large as post-reform (0.23). This implies that our model explains the behavior of the EU
Commission pre-reform much better than after the reform. We interpret this first finding
as a sign that the predictability of merger policy decreased after the introduction of the
new merger regulation. A merger control approach based more on a case-by-case analysis
and relying less on clear-cut rules reduces the predictive power of ’external’, observable
determinants.
Looking at the other measures of goodness of fit, our model is able to correctly classify
87% of the observations pre-reform, whereas post-reform we correctly classify only 71%
of the observations. We can also identify where this difference comes from. There is very
little difference pre-reform (86%) and post-reform (83%) in the ability of our model to
correctly classify the actions by the EU Commission measured by the sensitivity. On
the contrary, post-reform the model is much less able to correctly classify the outright
clearances, i.e. specificity. This happens in only 54% of the cases post-reform versus
87% of the cases pre-reform. Therefore, it seems that post-reform it is more difficult to
predict the absence of an action by the EC based on measurable characteristics. We can
conclude that this first piece of evidence supports the view that the merger policy reform
decreased legal certainty.
We then look at the observable factors, which are significant predictors of the merger
control outcome and identify some differences. A first set of variables that we consider
is related to the ’political economy environment’. The country of origin of the firms
involved in a merger case is an important driver of the EC’s decision. In both periods,
the probability of eliciting an action is over 42% lower if a US firm is involved. Also,
there is a shift toward a significant reduction in the likelihood of an action if a big EU
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country was involved in the case post-merger reform. This confirms the argument put
forward by Horn and Levinsohn (2001), who point to the effectiveness of the political
pressure by large countries.27
Merger specific characteristics play a more significant role pre-reform, with a significant
increase in the probability of eliciting an action for full mergers, and mergers between
large firms and with large competitors. This corresponds to the intuition that full merg-
ers are potentially more harmful to competition than mere share acquisitions or joint
ventures. It also suggests that the EC was more suspicious of concentrations among
large firms pre-reform, which can be seen as in accordance with the doctrine dictated by
the dominance test. Post-reform, instead, full mergers are 21% significantly less likely to
be remedied or blocked. While the size of the merging firms does not play a role anymore,
the size of the competitors still significantly increases the likelihood of an action, which
can be seen as more in line with the new SIEC test.
The anti-competitive nature of the merger should be the main driver of the antitrust
decision. We use two different proxies for this unobserved factor. Our first indicator
is the size of the announcement CAARs of the rivals, as the signals upon which the
market bases its evaluation of a merger might also be available to DG Comp during its
assessment of the combination. Even though the CAAR-coefficient assumes the expected
sign after the reform, no statistically significant relationship emerges. Instead, the fact
that the merger went to phase 2, which is our second indicator of the competitive issues
raised by the merger, is a very significant predictor. Yet, sizeable effects are only seen
pre-reform (an increase of 78% in the likelihood of an action), while post-reform the
increase is by only 5%. This corroborates the fact that in more recent years the EC
increasingly started to use remedies also in the early investigation phase. The market
definition is an important determinant of an intervention. If the relevant market is defined
nationally, the likelihood of eliciting an action increases by over 43% pre-reform and 58%
post-reform: smaller product markets are more problematic. Consistently, post-reform,
if the involved firms (merging and rivals) originate from more geographic world regions,
the probability of intervention is significantly reduced. Industry effects are significant
pre-reform (transport and finance) and post-reform (communication).
Finally, we look at whether past decisions of the EC affect current decisions to capture
possible learning or path-dependency effects. If the EC was very active in the last-but-
one quarter, the probability of an action increases significantly. This points to some kind
of path-dependency in the EC’s decisions. The limited resources’ argument seems to
have bite post-reform, since the likelihood of an intervention decreases significantly with
27The big EU countries are: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK.
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an increase of notifications in the last quarter. Post-reform, if there are more abortions
in the previous last-but-one quarter, the EC steps in less frequently. This might be an
indication that abortions or withdrawals have a deterrent effect post-reform, an issue to
which we return later. We also observe a positive and significant time trend toward more
interventions by the EC in the post-reform period.
As we explain in the appendix A.4, we use the predicted values from these probit
regressions to estimate the probability of an action ρ̂, which is used to build our measure
of corrected CAARs that will be used in the following steps of our analysis.
4.2. Type I and Type II Errors
The next piece of evidence on the effects of the merger control reform is the analysis of
the EU Commission’s possible mistakes in the enforcement of the merger regulation. We
first look at simple frequencies, which are reported in table 4.
[insert Table 4 here]
Post-reform, we observe on average more type I errors (32% compared to 22%) and
less type II errors (18% compared to 27%) than in the pre-reform period. This hints to
the fact that the EC has become, on average, more active since the introduction of the
new merger regulation: it intervenes more often in pro-competitive mergers and there are
fewer anti-competitive cases without intervention. While a welfare analysis of this policy
shift is not possible in our context, we want to stress that we measure weak type I errors.
The cost generated by the application of a remedy on a merger, which is pro-competitive
on average over all involved product and geographical markets, is possibly smaller than
the cost of letting anti-competitive mergers through completely unchallenged.
To analyze the determinants of type I errors (i.e. the EC intervenes in pro-competitive
mergers), we use the variables discussed in section 2.2.1.28 The results of regression (3)
are reported in table 5.
[insert Table 5 here]
First, we look at measures of governmental pressure. If one of the merging parties is a
US-based firm, the likelihood of wrongly eliciting an action in pro-competitive mergers is,
ceteris paribus, 76% lower in the pre-reform period and 57% lower after the reform. This
reflects the results discussed above when we presented the determinants of an action.
28Notice that, for the post-reform period, we were forced to drop some variables because of collinearity
problems due to the small sample size.
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Apparently, thus, the EC is particularly cautious to avoid making type I errors when US
firms are involved and this pattern does not change after the reform. We do not find
any evidence of lobbying by firms, as expressed by the gains they obtain through the
mergers, both before and after the reform.
Full, pro-competitive mergers are more likely to be wrongly remedied before the reform
but less so after the reform. Before the reform, a type I error is significantly more
likely when the merging firms and the competitors are large, while after the reform
the role of competitors is not significant anymore. Post-reform, cross-border mergers
are more likely to be wrongly remedied, however. The market definition is again very
important. The EC tends to commit significantly more type I errors if the market is
narrowly defined (nationally), since the likelihood of a mistake significantly decreases if
the market is defined to be EU-wide or world-wide. This pattern is even reinforced post-
reform. Additionally, post-reform, the fact that the merger affects several geographic
regions reduces type I errors. Both before and after the introduction of the new merger
regulation, we find significant industry effects. Only after the reform does it seem that
the EC’s past decisions affect the proclivity of type I errors. The likelihood decreases
if the number of notifications increases: A large work-load prevents the EC from being
too pro-active in general and, in particular, against pro-competitive cases. The model’s
predictive power is very high both in terms of pseudo − R2 and in terms of correct
predications. Low values for the specificity statistic mostly explain why post-reform the
percentage of correctly classified cases decreases from 93% to 82%.
We then move to the estimation of equation (4): the determinants of type II errors
(i.e. the EC unconditionally clears anti-competitive mergers). The marginal effects of
the probit estimations are reported in table 6.
[insert Table 6 here]
We estimate significantly more type II errors in mergers involving US firms and merg-
ing parties coming from the big EU countries, but only post-merger reform. This hints
at some form of political pressure by national governments. Moreover, we observe signif-
icant effects for the gains variables, which might signal lobbying activity by the involved
firms. Indeed, the larger the gains for the merging firms, the lower the likelihood of
eliciting an action in an anti-competitive merger, which is consistent with successful lob-
bying by merging parties. On the contrary, the coefficient for the rivals is negative and
significant in the post-reform period. This clearly goes against the idea that the rivals
were also successful in lobbying the EC to let an anti-competitive merger be cleared. The
negative sign might be interpreted as revealing that the EC is increasingly careful not to
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commit type II errors when the merger becomes more anti-competitive, i.e. the larger
the profit gains for the rivals. Post-reform, the EC seems to be too lenient toward full
mergers, cross-border mergers, mergers involving large parties, and mergers concerning
many world regions and product markets. The likelihood of type II errors increase in
phase 2 post-reform, while pre-reform it decreases if the merger entered the in-depth
investigation phase. This indicates that the EC became too hesitant to block or remedy
mergers post-reform in phase 2. Again the predictions of the model are quite accurate
with a pseudo − R2 of over 50% and the percentage of correct predictions are close to
90% in both periods.
To conclude, our analysis so far shows that DG Comp became more pro-active and
therefore the composition of the mistakes changed toward more (weak) type I and less
type II errors, particularly in phase 2. Post-reform, we find some evidence of successful
political pressure by large EU countries and the US and lobbying by merging parties to
get potentially anti-competitive mergers cleared.
4.3. Rent-Reversion Estimations
We now turn to the assessment of the effectiveness of different merger policy tools to
reduce the anti-competitive rents generated by the merger. We estimate equation (5) for
the merging parties and their rivals separately. The dependent variable, the probability-
corrected decision CAAR, is regressed on different constants for the different decisions
(clearance, behavioral and structural remedies, and prohibition), and on the inter-
action terms of decision type and probability-corrected announcement CAARs. These
coefficients measure the rent-reversion achieved by the respective decisions of DG Comp.
The regression results reported in table 7 for the pre-reform period are very close to those
obtained by Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010a) for the years 1990-2002.
[insert Table 7 here]
We estimate a negative and significant slope of -0.92 for outright blockings for merging
firms, which is also negative but not significant for rivals (-0.53). Both coefficients are
not statistically significantly different from minus one. Hence, prohibitions seem to fully
reverse the rents measured by the stock market around the announcement of the merger,
and can be interpreted as being an effective merger policy tool.
Clearances have a positive and significant effect on merging firms as measured by the
intercept, yet, only in the pre-reform period. This suggests that outright clearances send
a positive, unexpected signal to the market. For rivals, the positive and significant slope
estimates, both pre- and post-reform, imply that after an outright clearance their rents
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increase with the size of their announcement rents, which we interpret as a measure of
anti-competitiveness. Hence, our interpretation is that these findings are consistent with
the market evaluating the cost of a type II error: the more anti-competitive the deal is
(i.e. the larger the rivals’ rents at announcement), the more rivals profit from an outright
clearance. The coefficient estimates for remedies are also not in line with the predictions
for an effective merger control. In particular, the predicted negative shift for rivals is not
observed pre-reform, since the estimated intercepts are not significantly different from
zero. For merging firms, we find divestitures to even produce a positive and significant
shift.
To sum up, the main results pre-reform are: 1) prohibitions achieve full rent-reversion;
2) remedies do not achieve full rent-reversion on average; 3) outright clearances increase
rents for merging firms and rivals, and the larger the merger effect at announcement
the more they do so. Our interpretation of these findings in terms of merger policy
effectiveness is: 1) prohibitions are an effective merger control tool; 2) remedies are not
perfectly effective; and 3) some outright clearances might indeed be type II errors of the
EC.
Looking at the post-reform sample, we only get two significant coefficients, the inter-
cept for behavioral remedies and the clearance slope for rivals. Notice, however, that
we cannot estimate the degree of rent-reversion achieved by prohibitions, since only
two mergers were blocked post-reform. The negative intercept estimates in the case
of remedies for rivals are indicative that remedies achieve, on average, some degree of
rent-reversion post-reform. Yet, this reversion is not connected to the size of the an-
nouncement gains, since all slope estimates in the case of remedies are not significantly
different from zero. The positive clearance slope for rivals can again indicate that the
market prices some of the Commission’s type II errors.
The comparison of the scenarios before and after the reform suggest that, indeed,
post-reform remedies have on average become a bit more effective in reverting rents.
However, we definitely do not observe full rent-reversion and outright clearances remain
good news for rivals, which we interpret as being their benefit from type II errors. Thus,
the reluctance of DG Comp to block mergers post-reform does not seem to be well-placed.
4.4. Deterrence Estimations
The last piece of evidence we propose relates to the deterrence properties of EU merger
control. As mentioned in section 2.2.4, the deterrence properties of merger control are
particularly relevant if type I and type II errors occur or remedies imposed by the antitrust
authority are not always effective in reverting the anti-competitive rents generated by the
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merger. This is exactly the situation that emerges from our results so far. To estimate the
degree of ’good’ deterrence achieved by the policy, we estimate model (6) and assess the
likelihood that a newly notified merger is anti-competitive as a function of the history of
past merger control decisions. The marginal effects of the probit estimations are reported
in table 8.
[insert Table 8 here]
We estimate negative and significant coefficients for the intensity of remedies in phase
1 and for prohibitions in the pre-reform period. When the EC increases the use of these
kinds of policy tools in the three to six months previous a newly notified merger, its likeli-
hood of being anti-competitive is significantly lower: these actions deter anti-competitive
mergers. Prohibitions deter because they are the toughest policy tools. Remedies in phase
1 deter because they often come at the expense of expected clearances (e.g. Seldeslachts,
Clougherty, and Barros (2009)) and because they are more clear cut and easy to imple-
ment and, hence, more effective than phase 2 remedies (e.g. Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu
(2010a) and European Commission (2005)). Remedies and abortions in phase 2, on the
contrary, do not deter anti-competitive mergers. They even increase the probability of
anti-competitive mergers, possibly because they come at the expenses of a tougher action
(prohibition) and therefore signal a soft antitrust stance by the EC.
Once again, we cannot test for the effects of prohibitions post-reform, as only two
mergers were blocked after 2004. However, the ratios of withdrawn or aborted mergers
in phase 1 and phase 2 have a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of a newly
notified merger being anti-competitive. Moreover, both the remedy ratios in phase 1 and
in phase 2 have a negative, though not significant, effect on the probability of a merger
to be anti-competitive. After the reform, there was a clear policy shift toward a different
use of merger tools. Prohibitions became a very rare event, and withdrawals appear to at
least partially take over their deterrent role. One possible interpretation of these findings
is that firms were pushed by the EC to withdraw particularly problematic mergers by
setting the anti-competitive concerns at such a high level that any kind of remedy would
have become too costly. Hence, these abortions might have been effective prohibitions.
4.5. Robustness Checks
4.5.1. Purely Horizontal Mergers
As discussed in section 2.1, the correspondence between the change in consumer surplus
and competitors profits does not necessarily hold for non-horizontal mergers. In all
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regressions we used a dummy for conglomerate mergers to control for this issue, which
is set equal to 1 for all those cases in which the Commission mentioned conglomerate,
vertical, or foreclosure effects as one of its leading arguments in support of the final
decision. In this section we discuss the results that we obtain by dropping all these 118
cases from our sample, which leaves us with 162 mergers pre-reform and 46 post-reform.29
The results for the merger policy’s predictability are only minimally affected in terms
of sign and significance.30 We observe some small changes in the size of the estimated
marginal effect. Post-reform, the fit of the model is slightly increased even though some
variables must be dropped because of collinearity due to the extremely small sample size
(46 observations). The percentage of type I errors is higher than in the full sample (22%
pre-reform and 43% post-reform) and a similar pattern is observed for the type II errors
(33% pre-reform and 13.6% post-reform). Hence, the tendencies of a reduction of type
II errors at the expense of an increased number of type I errors that we observed in the
full sample are reinforced when considering purely horizontal mergers. The determinants
of both types of errors are very comparable in terms of sign, significance, and size of
the marginal effect pre-reform. While the market definition variables becomes not sig-
nificant in the type II regression, in both type I and type II regressions the effect for
the US becomes even larger and more significant. Due to the limited sample size, it is
unfortunately not possible to estimate the determinants of the errors post-reform.31
Also the rent-reversion regressions reflect the main findings observed in the full sample.
The full rent-reversion achieved by the blocking decisions pre-reform is, as expected, even
reinforced in the sub-sample of horizontal mergers – the coefficients are now -0.66 for the
merging parties and -1.32 for the rivals which, in both cases, are not significantly different
from -1. The sign and size of the other coefficients are comparable to those from the main
specification, hence the results are not qualitatively affected. Post-reform, the slope for
clearance for the rivals is still positive and significant, while the partial rent-reversion
achieved by divestiture cannot be confirmed. Also in this case, the same qualitative
results are attained using the second definition of horizontal mergers.
29As an alternative definition for horizontal mergers, we also use a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if
both merging parties share their primary SIC-classification codes. While the two definitions overlap
for most of our cases (60%), in some they don’t. According to this second definition, we drop 118
observations (54 pre-reform and 64 post-reform).
30Due to lack of space, we do not report all tables. The extensive results can, however, be obtained
from the authors upon request.
31Using the second definition for horizontal mergers, the results pre-reform are very similar to those
obtained for the full sample. The results for the post-reform regressions are in line with the main
specifications, yet several coefficients are less precisely estimated and thus less significant due to the
small samples size.
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Concerning the deterrence regressions, the pre-reform results from the full sample
are almost perfectly matched for purely horizontal mergers. Post-reform, some of the
coefficients estimates become not significant due to the small sample size, even though
the sign and size of the coefficients are not affected. Overall, we can therefore conclude
that focusing on purely horizontal mergers does not alter our qualitative results, even
though the smaller sample size in some cases affects the precision of the estimation and
hence the significance level, especially post-reform.
4.5.2. The Timing of the Reform
To identify the effect of the reform, we choose the official date in which it legally came
into force as a marking point for the pre- and post-reform periods. This choice of timing
has a clear justification, since the EC could not have used the legal framework provided
by ECMR 04 before this date. However, there might be reason to think that the right
timing to assess the change in policy could have been before or after this date. On the one
hand, it could have been before, because some of the reform’s elements were implemented
during the months antecedent the legal introduction of the new merger regulation and
could have affected the Commission’s policy enforcement.32 On the other hand, the
right timing to start the reform’s assessment could also have been after May 2004, since
it might have taken time before some of the innovations brought by the reform had a
clear policy impact. Hence, we propose two robustness checks for this issue. First, we
date the starting of the post-reform period back to the beginning of 2003. Second, we
eliminate the entire year 2004 from the sample.
In both cases, the predictability of the policy pre-reform slightly increases (pseudo-R2
of 0.57 and 0.52 in the two robustness checks respectively) and the number of significant
regressors becomes larger, which reinforces our argument that the predictability of EU
merger policy started to decrease around the legal introduction of the new merger reg-
ulation due to the implementation of a more economic-oriented approach to the merger
appraisal. This is confirmed by the post-reform results – especially when we concentrate
on the post-2004 period – which show a drop in the specificity statistics to 42%.
The frequency of type I and type II errors is not strongly affected by the selection of a
different date or sample for the introduction of the reform. The determinants regressions
for type I errors show similar coefficients estimates to the main specification, some of
32Lyons (2004), for instance, notices that several changes in merger control were being implemented
around 2003, such as the introduction of devil’s advocate panels, the proposal of a clarification of
the dominance test, the appointment of the first chief economist, the publishing of the draft merger
guidelines and the extension for timetable for remedies.
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which are however less significant (EU firms’s involvement, regions and markets involved,
industry dummies). Contrary to our expectations, this is particularly true post-reform.
A similar pattern results from the type II regressions in both robustness checks. However,
the post-reform results are much more consistent with our main specification when we
exclude the entire year 2004. Again, this suggests that the change in the Commission’s
behavior around the time of the legal introduction of the reform in 2004 is particularly
important in the analysis of the determinants of the the Commission’s errors.
The rent-reversion regressions are not strongly affected by the change in the timing
of the introduction of the ECMR 04 if not for a drop in significance in the post-reform
regressions in both robustness checks, where no coefficient estimates are significant. Fi-
nally, choosing the beginning of 2003 as the introduction year does not change any of
the signs of the coefficients estimates both pre- and post-reform in the deterrence re-
gression. Yet, it leads to a drop in significance, especially for prohibitions pre-reform
and withdrawals post-reform. However, when we exclude the entire year 2004, all the
findings obtained in our main regressions are perfectly mirrored in the robustness checks
and significance is restored.
All in all then, it seems that our qualitative results also hold if we adopt another date
for the formal introduction of the merger policy reform. However, results are much more
significant, clear cut and in line with our main specification when we exclude the year
2004. This suggests that the change in policy around the date of the legal introduction
of ECMR 04 was substantial and supports our choice as the most precise way to identify
the effects of the reform.
5. Conclusion
In our attempt to assess the economic impact of the change in legislation due to the
2004 merger policy reform in Europe, we brought forward four pieces of evidence: (1)
estimations of the determinants of intervention, (2) estimations of the frequency and
determinants of type I and type II errors, (3) estimations of rent-reversion by merger
decisions, and (4) estimations of the deterrence effect of merger decisions. These elements
are thought to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the entire process of merger control:
from an ex ante perspective on the predictability of the policy, to an in-fieri analysis of
the effect of particular merger tools on the merger cases under scrutiny, to finish with the
ex-post view of the effect of current policy enforcement on future firms’ behavior. The
identification of the reform’s effect is achieved by comparing the performance of merger
control along these four dimensions in the pre-reform and post-reform periods.
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Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find evidence of a decrease
in legal certainty, since DG Comp’s decisions become more difficult to predict on the
basis of observable characteristics post-reform. In particular, it has become significantly
more difficult to predict if the EC will unconditionally clear a merger. Second, there is
a tendency toward more interventions, especially a larger use of remedies, post-reform,
resulting in fewer type II errors at the expense of more (weak) type I errors. One reason
is that markets are sometimes defined too narrowly. In phase 2, however, it appears that
the EC has become too lenient, since type II errors increase during this investigation
phase compared to pre-reform. The existence of political and firm lobbying might be
a possible explanation. Third, according to our rent-reversion regressions, remedies are
not effective before and only very loosely effective after the reform. Some outright clear-
ances are seen by the market as good news for the rivals, possibly indicating the cost of
type II errors by the EC. Only prohibitions achieve full rent-reversion. However, we can
estimate their effect only pre-reform since only two mergers were blocked post-reform.
Therefore, given the effectiveness of this merger policy tool compared to remedies, it
appears that the EC blocks too few mergers. Finally, we measure significant deterrence
effects pre- and post-reform. Pre-reform, these are achieved mostly via phase 1 remedies
and prohibitions which is in line with these being the most effective merger control tools.
Post-reform it appears that withdrawals/abortions substitute for the role of prohibitions.
Our robustness checks support two of our main identification assumptions: to identify
anti-competitive mergers via the rivals’ change in profits seems to be a good approxima-
tion as confirmed by the regressions from the sample of purely horizontal mergers, where
this identification strategy is more likely to hold. Moreover, to identify the introduction
of the reform with the date of its legal implementation in May 2004 seems to be key for
understanding the change in policy brought about by the reform.
In conclusion, the introduction of the ECMR 04 seems to have changed European
merger policy. Yet, in terms of effectiveness, it has been only a modest improvement.
While, on the one hand, decisions are based on a more economic analysis and we observe
fewer type II errors than before, we also find that the increased focus on remedies was
only partially successful and cannot replace the policy tool of straight prohibitions, which
solve both the competitive concerns raised by the concentration and deter future anti-
competitive mergers. Clearly, this policy shift was not only the product of the reform
and the belief that remedies are a more sophisticated and cleaner instrument to almost
surgically appraise merger cases. Foremost, it might be the persistent reaction to the
substantial shock and political climate which originated from the Court of First Instance’s
reverses of three prominent cases in the early 2000s. Yet, an approach to merger control
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that is more clearly based on economic principles does not necessarily mean abandoning
the use of prohibitions, as shown by US antitrust authorities that are far less hesitant to
block mergers than their European counterpart. Thus, according to our analysis, while
some of the changes brought about by the reform seem to go in the right direction, the
positive impact on the efficiency of European merger control is dampened especially by
the fact that DG Comp deprives itself of its most powerful tool: prohibitions.
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6. Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Evolution of cases and decisions in our sample
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We report the yearly average of notified cases as well as the ratio of different decisions (remedies in
phase 1 and phase 2, prohibitions) to the notified cases in our sample.
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Figure 2: Evolution of cases and decisions in the population
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
N
o
ti
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
s
 p
e
r 
y
e
a
r
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Notifications per year
Remedies ratio - ph1
Remedies ratio - ph2
Abortions ratio
Prohibitions ratio
We report yearly average for the number of notified cases as well as the ratio of different outcomes
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all EU merger cases.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Dummies
Sample Population
Pre- Post-reform Pre- Post-reform
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Remedies 0.421 (0.49) 0.600 (0.49) 0.069 (0.05) 0.055 (0.04)
in Phase 1 0.144 (0.35) 0.464 (0.50) 0.041 (0.04) 0.044 (0.03)
in Phase 2 0.278 (0.45) 0.136 (0.34) 0.028 (0.03) 0.011 (0.01)
Cleared 0.523 (0.50) 0.382 (0.49) 0.931 (0.05) 0.945 (0.04)
Prohibited 0.056 (0.23) 0.018 (0.13) 0.008 (0.01) 0.001 (0.00)
Phase 2 cases 0.421 (0.49) 0.236 (0.43) 0.055 (0.23) 0.026 (0.16)
Aborted/Withdrawn 0.033 (0.03) 0.024 (0.01)
Remedies: Divestiture 0.287 (0.45) 0.455 (0.50)
in Phase 1 0.097 (0.30) 0.336 (0.47)
in Phase 2 0.190 (0.39) 0.118 (0.32)
Remedies: Behavioral 0.259 (0.44) 0.245 (0.43)
in Phase 1 0.065 (0.25) 0.182 (0.39)
in Phase 2 0.194 (0.40) 0.064 (0.25)
National markets 0.384 (0.49) 0.418 (0.50)
EU-wide markets 0.407 (0.49) 0.373 (0.49)
Worldwide markets 0.204 (0.40) 0.200 (0.40)
Conglomerate merger 0.250 (0.43) 0.582 (0.50)
Full merger 0.579 (0.49) 0.709 (0.46)
US firms involved 0.315 (0.47) 0.191 (0.39)
Observations 216 110 2402 1634
Remedies represents the fraction of cases that were either cleared subject to conditions & obliga-
tions (blockings are reported under Prohibited). Cleared is the fraction of cases that were per-
mitted without conditions & obligations, Phase 2 cases were subjected to an in-depth investigation.
Aborted/Withdrawn are transactions that were notified to the EC, but withdrawn during the review
procedure. National, EU −wide and Worldwide markets refer to the market definitions applied by the
EC, Conglomerate mergers involve conglomerate, vertical, or foreclosure effects, Full mergers means
that one of the merging firms was acquired in its entirety. US firms involved equals one if one of the
merging firms has its headquarter in the US.
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Table 2: CAARs of merging parties and rivals by period and event
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
N Mean S.E. N Mean S.E.
Merging Firms
Announcement 200 0.016∗∗ (0.009) 96 0.011∗ (0.008)
Decision 197 −0.003 (0.008) 96 −0.005 (0.005)
Rivals
Announcement 208 0.008 (0.007) 105 0.011∗ (0.007)
Decision 207 −0.003 (0.009) 105 −0.009 (0.007)
The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 3: Probit Model: Probability of Intervention
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved −0.425∗∗∗ (0.098) −0.424∗∗∗ (0.077)
EU firms involved −0.291∗∗∗ (0.105) 0.110∗ (0.065)
Big EU country 0.039 (0.107) −0.361∗∗ (0.176)
Conglomerate merger 0.455∗∗∗ (0.139) 0.400 (0.283)
Full merger 0.310∗∗∗ (0.114) −0.209∗∗ (0.088)
Crossborder merger 0.003 (0.110) 0.130 (0.115)
Log(MV) merging firms 0.043∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.012 (0.007)
Log(MV) rivals 0.034∗∗ (0.014) 0.033∗ (0.017)
Rival announcement CAAR −0.525 (0.390) 0.720 (0.714)
Phase 2 Case 0.780∗∗∗ (0.069) 0.049∗∗ (0.023)
Worldwide markets −0.186 (0.164) −0.063 (0.109)
National markets 0.435∗∗∗ (0.088) 0.581∗∗ (0.239)
Number of regions involved 0.053 (0.066) −0.110∗∗∗ (0.042)
Number of markets involved 0.103 (0.077) 0.032 (0.065)
Mining 0.287 (0.262) −0.371 (0.255)
Manufacturing 0.024 (0.169) −0.045 (0.248)
Transport 0.364∗∗∗ (0.111) −0.240 (0.278)
Communication 0.134 (0.135) −0.473∗∗∗ (0.157)
Finance −0.339∗∗ (0.150)
Service −0.208 (0.211) −0.398∗∗ (0.175)
Lagged notifications 0.001 (0.003) −0.014∗∗∗ (0.005)
Lagged actions ratio 1.601∗∗ (0.693) 5.453∗∗∗ (0.990)
Lagged abortions ratio 0.153 (1.838) −12.345∗∗∗ (1.104)
Time trend 0.002 (0.007) 0.042∗∗ (0.018)
Observations 203 105
Pseudo R2 0.51 0.23
CorrClassified 87% 71%
Sensitivity 86% 83%
Specificity 87% 54%
The dependent variable is action, defined as Pj = 1 when the merger is remedied or
blocked, and zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported. dF/dx is for discrete change
of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow
for correlation among observations from the same year. The symbols ***, **, and * rep-
resent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The EU firms dummy
indicates that one of the merging parties is headquartered in the EU. Big EU countries
are Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, Crossborder mergers involve at least two
nations, Log(MV ) refers to the logged market values of merging parties and rivals. For
the Rival announcement CAAR see A.3. The number of regions and markets variables
count the (geographic) regions and (product) markets concerned by a merger. Mining,
Manufacturing, Transport, Communication, Finance and Service are industry dummies.
For the lagged population variables, see 2.2.4. The time trend is measured in quarters. The
remaining dummies are defined at the bottom of table 1.
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Table 4: Type I/II errors by period
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean S.D. Count Mean S.D. Count
Type I error 0.221 (0.416) 46 0.324 (0.470) 34
Type II error 0.269 (0.445) 56 0.181 (0.387) 19
Frequency of type I errors (action in a pro-competitive merger) and type II errors
(unconditional clearance of an anti-competitive merger) in the sample.
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Table 5: Probit Model: Probability of Type I errors
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved −0.761∗∗∗ (0.142) −0.565∗∗∗ (0.188)
EU firms involved −0.822∗∗∗ (0.148) 0.804∗∗∗ (0.147)
Big EU country 0.384∗∗ (0.152) −0.934∗∗∗ (0.093)
Profit change - merging firms −0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.002)
Profit change - rivals 0.000 (0.000) −0.000 (0.000)
Conglomerate merger 0.114 (0.409)
Full merger 0.573∗∗∗ (0.190) −0.720∗∗∗ (0.222)
Crossborder merger 0.112 (0.227) 0.805∗∗∗ (0.172)
Log(MV) merging firms 0.065∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.172∗∗∗ (0.052)
Log(MV) rivals 0.072∗∗ (0.028) −0.074 (0.046)
Worldwide markets −0.646∗∗∗ (0.111) −0.883∗∗∗ (0.071)
EU-wide markets −0.722∗∗∗ (0.125) −0.863∗∗∗ (0.132)
Number of regions involved 0.102 (0.138) −0.323∗∗∗ (0.073)
Number of markets involved −0.006 (0.239) 0.366 (0.256)
Phase 2 case 0.971∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.423∗ (0.245)
Manufacturing −0.635∗ (0.350) −0.619∗∗ (0.265)
Communication −0.460∗∗∗ (0.123) −0.786∗∗∗ (0.170)
Service −0.467∗∗∗ (0.105) −0.414∗ (0.245)
Electricity −0.431∗∗∗ (0.108)
Finance −0.563∗∗∗ (0.097)
Transport −0.223 (0.415)
Lagged notifications −0.003 (0.009) −0.039∗∗∗ (0.014)
Lagged actions ratio 5.088 (4.144) −0.880 (7.028)
Lagged abortions ratio 0.527 (2.714) −39.688 (39.004)
Time trend 0.012 (0.018) 0.096 (0.071)
Observations 88 49
Pseudo R2 0.70 0.46
CorrClassified 93% 82%
Sensitivity 93% 93%
Specificity 93% 67%
The dependent variable is type I error defined as E1j = 1 if Pj = 1 and Dj = 0, and zero otherwise
(action in a pro-competitive merger). Marginal effects are reported. dF/dx is for discrete change of
dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow for correlation among
observations form the same year. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Probit Model: Probability of Type II errors
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
US firms involved 0.149 (0.093) 0.899∗∗∗ (0.090)
EU firms involved −0.162 (0.113) −0.282∗∗ (0.135)
Big EU country 0.154∗ (0.087) 0.711∗∗∗ (0.216)
Profit change - merging firms 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.005∗∗ (0.002)
Profit change - rivals −0.000 (0.000) −0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Conglomerate merger −0.236∗∗∗ (0.089) −1.000∗∗∗ (0.001)
Full merger −0.306∗∗∗ (0.104) 0.389∗ (0.202)
Crossborder merger 0.062 (0.112) 0.246∗∗∗ (0.063)
Log(MV) merging firms −0.029∗ (0.015) 0.248∗∗ (0.098)
Log(MV) rivals −0.025∗ (0.014) 0.031 (0.031)
EU-wide markets −0.223∗ (0.135) −0.271 (0.234)
National markets −0.250∗ (0.133) −1.000∗∗∗ (0.001)
Number of regions involved −0.007 (0.049) 0.119∗∗ (0.052)
Number of markets involved −0.036 (0.082) 0.276∗ (0.154)
Phase 2 case −0.469∗∗∗ (0.141) 0.921∗∗∗ (0.097)
Manufacturing 0.212 (0.170) −0.122 (0.315)
Communication 0.009 (0.187)
Service 0.426 (0.599) 0.847∗∗∗ (0.099)
Electricity −0.050 (0.126)
Trade 0.094 (0.213)
Transport −0.105∗ (0.056) 0.534 (0.444)
Lagged notifications −0.002 (0.001) −0.006 (0.006)
Lagged actions ratio −0.153 (0.514)
Lagged abortions ratio 0.073 (1.122)
Time trend 0.008∗∗∗ (0.003)
Observations 100 42
Pseudo R2 0.55 0.54
CorrClassified 87% 90%
Sensitivity 91% 88%
Specificity 83% 92%
The dependent variable is type II error defined as E2j = 1 if Pj = 0 and Dj = 1, and zero otherwise
(unconditional clearance of an anti-competitive merger). Marginal effects are reported. dF/dx is for
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow for
correlation among observations form the same year. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7: Effectiveness Regressions
Pre-reform Post-reform
Merging Parties Rivals Merging Parties Rivals
Clearance 0.244∗ (0.133) 0.010 (0.070) −0.066 (0.096) −0.071 (0.061)
Behavioral 0.107 (0.155) 0.038 (0.074) −0.015 (0.069) −0.102∗ (0.041)
Divestiture 0.330∗ (0.159) 0.035 (0.098) −0.006 (0.055) −0.093 (0.071)
Prohibitions 0.309 (0.177) −0.228 (0.160)
ΠA∗ij *Clearance 0.031 (0.141) 0.331
∗∗ (0.148) −0.069 (0.069) 0.611∗ (0.250)
ΠA∗ij *Behavioral 0.075 (0.247) −0.069 (0.333) −0.126 (0.095) 0.030 (0.056)
ΠA∗ij *Divestiture −0.496 (0.309) −0.141 (0.372) 0.234 (0.227) −0.016 (0.100)
ΠA∗ij *Prohibition −0.923
∗∗ (0.316) −0.532 (0.408)
Observations 143 135 89 88
R2 0.26 0.20 0.35 0.21
The dependent variable is the decision corrected CAAR in merger j (ΠD∗fj ) for the merging firms (i = M) and competitors
(i = C) respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and allow for correlation among observations from the same year.
We control for industry effects (manufacturing, mining electricity, trade, transport, communications), merger-specific effects (full
and conglomerate mergers) and a time trend. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
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Table 8: Deterrence Regressions
Pre-reform Post-reform
Lagged notifications −0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002)
Lagged remedies ratio - ph1 −1.062∗ (0.587) −2.721 (3.143)
Lagged remedies ratio - ph2 2.909∗∗ (1.259) −0.554 (6.989)
Lagged abortions ratio - ph1 0.581 (1.401) −9.673∗∗ (4.464)
Lagged abortions ratio - ph2 6.756∗∗ (3.350) −14.072∗∗ (7.009)
Lagged prohibitions ratio −7.099∗ (4.287)
Observations 200 105
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.10
CorrClassified 63% 63%
Sensitivity 68% 61%
Specificity 58% 64%
The dependent variable is Dj = 1 if Π
A∗
Cj ≥ 0, zero otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses are robust
and allow for correlation among observations from the same year. Marginal effects are reported. We
control for industry effects (manufacturing, mining, services), merger-specific effects (full, cross-border
and conglomerate mergers, relevant markets), firm-specific effects (country of origin, size) and a time
trend. The symbols ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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Appendix
A. Quantifying the Effect of a Merger and Merger Decision
The estimation of the impact of a merger and merger decision proceeds in several steps.
First, we estimate a market model for each firm, which allows us to simulate the counter-
factual scenario of what would have happened if the merger had not occured. Using this
information, we then calculate the cumulative abnormal rents generated by the merger or
merger decision over an event window spanning several days around the relevant dates.
We then aggregate the cumulative abnormal returns for the merging firms and their rivals,
to obtain a merger-specific information. Finally, we assume that market participants can
- to a certain degree - foresee the merger decisions, which is priced in the stock of firms
around the relevant event. Hence, to obtain a more precise measure of the competitive
effect of the merger and merger decision, we correct for these market expectations.
A.1. The Market Model
Define Ri,j as the return of firm i at date j and Rmarketi,j as the market return index of
the branch of firm i. The market model predicts that the daily return of a commodity
i is proportional to the market index at any given point in time t. Formally: Ri,t =
α+ βRmarket,t + εi,t.
33 We can then calibrate the coefficients of this model for all firms
i = 1, . . . , N over a time period of 240 trading days, namely the period from 290 to 50
days prior to the announcement of the merger.34 Letting the estimation window end
50 days before the announcement (that is, the date on which the financial press wrote
about the proposed transaction) should yield unbiased estimates of the market model’s
coefficients and, hence, the ’normal’ firms’ return, which is our counterfactual and that
is given by: R̂i,t = α̂+ β̂Rmarket,t.
A.2. The Event Windows
The event windows are the time intervals around the dates of the relevant events (e.g.
merger or merger decision), during which new information hits the market. In the absence
of any information leakages, these windows can be reduced to the event day. The larger
the expectations that some information was leaked to the market prior to the event, the
33For the superiority of a market model over a constant mean return model in capturing abnormal
returns see MacKinlay (1997) or Schwert (1981).
34For some cases the market model could not be reliably estimated in this period due to data limitations.
In these cases the estimations window was shifted to 530 - 290 days prior to announcement.
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larger the window should be. Hence, the length of these windows is critical to the event
study’s ability to capture the profitability effects: if the window is too small, the effect
might not be wholly captured, whereas too large a window could dilute the result.35 To
account for the structurally different circumstances of the various events we consider, we
use both a long as well as a short window. The long window is the interval [t− 50, t+5]
(where t designates the date of the event), the short window is [t− 5, t+ 5].
For the announcement and the phase 2 decision, we employ the long window. In both
cases information leakages could occur substantially earlier than the date of the event in
question. Rumors of mergers often circulate for weeks before definitive signs reach the
financial press. The same holds for an in-depth merger investigation in phase 2, during
which the Commission often contacts competitors and customers of the merging firms
during its assessment and information is likely to leak to the market.36 These prolonged
processes could easily reduce uncertainty and allow the concerned parties to adjust their
anticipations.
The phase 1 investigation, on the other hand, lasts only 25 working days and is con-
ducted internally by DG Comp. Furthermore, a substantial part of this relatively short
time is utilized for the appraisal of administrative issues. We therefore assume that in-
formation leakages to the market occur no earlier than 5 days before the decision and
that the stock prices adjust in a short window around the decision. The event windows
are schematically depicted in figure 3.
Figure 3: Timeline of the events
ann - 50         ann         ph1          ph2
[ann - 290, ann - 50]
Market model estimation
[ann - 50, ann + 5]
CAAR ann
[ph1 - 5, ph1 + 5]
CAAR ph1
[ph2 - 50, ph2 + 5]
CAAR ph2
35Issues concerning the length of event windows and their ability to capture the effect of regulation are
more thoroughly discussed in Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu (2010b).
36The EC has a time-frame of 90 working days between phase 1 and phase 2 decisions.
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A.3. Aggregating the Abnormal Returns
The abnormal return of firm i at date j is defined as
ARi,j = Ri,j − Rˆi,j .
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are then obtained by summing up the abnormal
returns over the event window (t1, t2):
CARi(t1, t2) =
t2∑
t=t1
ARi,t.
These CARs measure the profitability impact of a combination at the firm-level. Mea-
suring firm-level effects has the advantage of allowing for asymmetric externalities of a
merger.37 While we allow for asymmetric externalities at the firm-level, the definition
of an anti-competitive merger has to be done at the aggregate level, since what matters
for the policy is the impact of the merger on the overall consumer surplus. Hence, to
obtain a measure of the total impact of a merger, we aggregate the merging firms’ as well
as rivals’ CARs at the merger level by using the relative market value of each firm as a
weight.38 The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) at event e (announcement,
decision) for firms f (f = M for merging firms and C for their competitors) in merger j
are then given by
CAARefj =
Nfj∑
i=1
CARei mvi
Nfj∑
i=1
mvi
e = ann, dec f = M,C j = 1, . . . , 326 (7)
where Nfj denotes the number of merging firm or rivals for merger j and mvi is the
market value of firm i. The CAARs, as an aggregate measure of the implications of a
merger, are used to classify pro- and anti-competitive mergers and serve in the probability
of intervention estimation.
A.4. Correcting for Expectations
We assume that market participants can to a certain degree anticipate the decisions of
DG Comp, but that there is no perfect foresight: If the market could perfectly foresee
37It is an empirically well-documented phenomenon that merger targets usually experience stock market
gains, whereas buyers often lose. Likewise, the externalities on rivals need not be evenly distributed
as the degree of competition among firms might vary.
38The idea of a ’firm portfolio’ weighted by market values is owed to Schwert (1981).
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the actions of the EC, there would be no significant stock reactions around the decision
dates. The fact that there are significant deviations from the market trend when news of
a decision reaches the concerned market participants can be interpreted as evidence in
favor of our assumption. Furthermore, the existence of prohibitions contradicts perfect
foresight: if managers could perfectly foresee the actions of DG Comp, mergers that end
up being blocked would not have been attempted in the first place, nor would there have
been significant reactions in response to their announcements.
Using the past merger control history and the knowledge of the structural character-
istics of a proposed merger, firms can form a prior of how likely it is that DG Comp
will intervene. This means that the observed abnormal returns around the event dates
do not measure the full effect but are the expectation-adjusted abnormal returns, which
take into account that the combination might not go through or be subjected to reme-
dies. Since we assume that the market’s assessment reveals the competitive nature of
a combination, we would like to remove this adjustment of expectations to obtain the
market assessment in absence of merger control.
If expectations are rational, the expected value of the EC’s decision is:39
E[Πdec] = ρΠaction + (1− ρ)Πclear (8)
where Πaction(Πclear) denotes the merger’s profitability in case of an action (a clear-
ance) and ρ is the probability of an action. The observed abnormal returns around the
announcement (Πann) therefore are equal to the real effect (Πann∗) plus the expected
value of the EC’s final decision (E[Πdec]). Assuming that an intervention by DG Comp
destroys the anti-competitive rents generated by a combination (Πaction = −Πann∗) in
their full extent (Πdec∗ = Πann∗),40 and that a clearance has no further effect on the
market (Πclear = 0), the impact of a merger can be written as:
Πann = Πann∗ + E[Πdec] = Πann∗ + ρ Πaction︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−Πann∗
+(1− ρ)Πclear︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
⇔ Πann∗ =
Πann
1− ρ (9)
Similarly, the effect that we measure around the decision (Πdec) is an update of the
market’s beliefs concerning that particular decision and, hence, the difference between
39Note that, to ease notation, we eliminate the subscript for the firms’ types (f = M for merging firms
and f = C for competitors) and the merger j.
40We realize that this assumption might be questioned, but it is necessary for probability correction and
seems less arbitrary than ex ante assuming a certain nonzero degree of rent reversal.
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the merger’s competitive effect and the market expectations of the commission decision’s
effect.41
Πdec = Πdec∗ + E[Πdec] = Πdec∗ + ρΠaction + (1− ρ)Πclear ⇔ Πdec∗ =
Πdec
1− ρ
If a case goes into phase 2, the market will again update its beliefs about remedies.42
The effect around the phase 1 decision accounts for the adjustment of market expectations
to the new state of beliefs, the sum of both decision effects captures the total impact of
the EC’s decision. The real effect of the decision is then given by
Πdec∗ =
ΠP1 +ΠP2
1− ρ
where ΠP1 (ΠP2) is the measured effect around the phase 1 (phase 2) decision date.
Combining the equations for the decisions yields
Πdec∗ =


Πdec
1−ρ
if phase 1 case
ΠP1+ΠP2
1−ρ
if phase 2 case
. (10)
Thus, to account for expectations, we need to estimate the ex ante likelihood of an
intervention for every merger j (ρj) and correct the CAARs measured around the an-
nouncement (ΠAfj) and the decision (Π
D
fj) of that merger according to equations (9) and
(10). This refinement improves the precision of the estimate of the market competitive
assessment of a merger.
41If the market had perfect foresight, we would measure only white noise around the decision. The
surprise value of the decision is due to the private information generated during the legal proceedings.
42The probability of a clearance subject to conditions and obligations is much higher for phase 2 cases
than for phase 1 cases; a blocking is possible only after a phase 2 investigation.
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